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1 The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a period of considerable change in
American labour relations, a change which is at the very heart of Daniel D. Ernst’s Lawyers
against  Labor.  Economic  changes  were  taking  place  with  the  decline  of  proprietary
capitalism  and  the  emergence,  alongside  the  notion  of  “business  trust,”  of  what
embattled proprietary capitalists saw as an equally dangerous “labor trust.” The “age of
the party” was coming to an end and being replaced by the “age of the group,” leading
Ernst to deal with the theory of interest groups and make clear that,  in his opinion,
pluralism appeared in the first decade of the new century and not, as many would have it,
much later.
2 The concept of industrial pluralism is all the more vital in the book since the cultural
backgrounds of the protagonists are given pride of place, shedding valuable light on the—
at times paradoxical—strategies of the employers and their lawyers on the one hand,
union representatives and their own lawyers on the other hand. For it is the evolution of
the  law that  Ernst  brilliantly  and comprehensively  presents  by  analysing  the  social,
political, and economic changes of the first decade of the twentieth century from the
perspective of an organisation set up by owners of family businesses to “litigate and lobby
against organised labor:” the American Anti-Boycott Association.
3 Co-founded by two Connecticut hat-manufacturers,  Charles Hart  Merritt  and Dietrich
Eduard Loewe, in an attempt to resist unionisation of their companies under threat of
strikes  and boycotts,  the AABA was operational  in August  1903 and recruited Daniel
Davenport, a lawyer with a Victorian education and outlook most suited to the defence of
the  interests  of  employers  who  cherished  the  values  of  freedom,  laissez-faire  and
individualism and felt that the existing law should be enforced to protect them from
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unduly powerful enemies. The particular strengths of the AABA were that it could finance
legal actions in areas where employers did not have access to inexpensive and swift relief
—secondary  picketing  and  boycott  cases—and  that  it  could  thus  acquire  valuable
expertise in labour law, an expertise that could be used time and again in other cases,
cases  preferably  chosen  so  as  to  obtain  maximum  publicity  and  a  favourable
jurisprudence nationwide.
4 Between the wave of cases of the “Great Upheaval” in the mid-1880s and the time when
the underlying values of the AABA had been so upset that it had to change its name to the
League  for  Industrial  Rights  (in  1918)—the  genteel  Victorian  tradition  was  gradually
becoming outdated and, with it, an individualistic, a priori conception of the law. (Charles
Hart Merritt’s  son,  Gordon Merritt,  who had assisted Davenport for many years as a
young lawyer,  embraced a more progressive approach,  adopting a corporate form of
liberal  pluralism.  Gordon Merritt  took over  from Davenport  in 1915.)  This  happened
under the influence of legal reformers whose ideas eventually seeped through into case-
law.
5 Ernst insists on the importance of  the educational backgrounds of  the AABA lawyers
(Davenport’s in Chapter 1 and Gordon Merritt’s in the last chapter) not only to underline
the shift in the organisation’s values or to highlight the paradox that lies in Davenport’s
legacy—an old-school Victorian individualist who worked hard for an organisation which
was meant to defend Victorian values but whose successes in promoting the usefulness of
his organisation among employers constitute a perfect example of pluralism at work and
a textbook example of how to run an interest group (chapter 3)—, but also to demonstrate
that the legal and political establishment had to undergo the same gradual conversion
towards a vision of the law that increasingly reflected the changes in society and was
more proactive, and that this conversion was spearheaded by legal intellectuals before
being applied in the courtroom.
6 Ernst gives the example of the gradual decline in the use of criminal conspiracy in labour
law cases and the increasing reliance on the law of intentional torts as a major step
forward deriving from the feeling that  employers  were given too great  an access  to
injunctions  and from the  rise  of  a  new profession,  that  of  the  legal  thinker,  whose
purpose was to adopt a more scientific approach to the law. An alternative was offered to
the old sic utere tuo ut non alienum non laedas maxim (“so use your own as not to injure
another”),  so  easily  interpreted  by  judges  as  banning  all  boycotts.  It  allowed  an
exceptionally progressive judge like Oliver Wendell Holmes, in the 1890s,  to launch a
scathing attack on the genteel tradition and the conclusions reached by judges in the
Great Upheaval cases: what he relied on to do so was the formula Sir Charles Bowen used
in preference to malice (Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1989)) in a famous
English case: the absence of “just cause and excuse.”
7 In spite of such developments, the AABA did not throw the genteel tradition overboard.
Far  from  it.  In  the  first  decade  of  the  new  century,  it  persisted  in  following  legal
principles dating back to the 1880s, admittedly encouraged by the fact that most judges
weren’t adapting fast either. That is particularly true of the organisation’s campaign to
get the closed-shop declared illegal. On that front however, after a number of trials and
many disagreements  as  to  the  interpretation  of  precedent,  the  AABA simply  had  to
concede defeat and, in 1915, Daniel Davenport himself had to acknowledge the legality of
the closed-shop (chapter 5).
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8 Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of Lawyers against Labor focus on what the AABA will be remembered
for.  What  Ernst  demonstrates  is  that  there  were  both  successes  and  defeats  in  the
courtroom but, irrespective of the legal outcome of the individual cases, the AABA was
extremely good at putting pressure on politicians, setting the agenda for its own purposes
and having an impact on the public debate. The Loewe v. Lawlor (1903-1917) and Buck’s
Stove and Range Company v. Gompers (1907-1914) cases provide perfect illustrations of that. 
9 Buck’s Stove was a particularly prominent case and it achieved great political significance
for a number of reasons: leaving aside the rather anecdotal fact that the judge’s blatant
bias and disgraceful behaviour caused him to resign in order to avoid impeachment, one
of them was the personality of the litigants and what they represented: the action was
brought by James Wallace Van Cleave, a very politically-minded anti-union employer who
also happened to be President of the NAM, and the defendants were the AFL top brass,
including Samuel Gompers. Another reason for the significance of Buck’s Stove was that
the period was characterized by deep incursions into party-politics, a trend exemplified
by Gompers’ unprecedented intervention in the congressional elections in 1906 and in the
1908 presidential elections. The legal significance of the case was limited and the result
satisfied no-one but, partly because Gompers was jailed for contempt of court and turned
the whole debate to questions of freedom of speech, Buck’s Stove contributed to a cross-
class  collaboration  which  left  the  AFL  closer  to  the  Democrats  than  ever  before,
particularly after 1914, a situation all the more worrying for the AABA since the AFL were
also building bridges with big business.
10 In Loewe on the other hand, the AABA achieved a great legal victory. To obtain more
damages, a precedent binding on all federal courts and a national audience,it had chosen
not to ground its action in the common law but to try to get the judges to decide that the
Sherman Act applied to labour. In the face of a disastrous defence on the part of the
United Hatters, the Danbury hat-manufacturer and the AABA got what they wanted in
1908 and once again with the rejection of the appeal. The provisions of the Sherman Act
did not apply to the hatters collectively,  as a separate legal  entity,  but to individual
employees, a great many of whom endured incredible hardships even though they had no
personal knowledge of the boycott, trapped as they were between the intransigence of
the AABA lawyers who, having sued them individually, demanded the full amount due,
and AFL leaders (particularly Gompers) who shared the AABA’s individualism and fear of
pluralism and vehemently rejected the idea of incorporation.  Loewe was a great legal
victory for  the AABA but caused the debate on incorporation to  gain momentum in
intellectual and legal circles. The National Civic Federation, the corporate liberals and
lawyers like Louis D. Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter led a campaign made more popular
by both Davenport’s and Gompers’ resistance, and paved the way for pluralism, even in
the ranks of the AABA. Gordon Merritt’s involvement in the pluralist debate over the
labour exemption (Chapter 9), albeit by bringing consumers into the equation, testifies to
this changing climate.
11 The  debate  over  the  Clayton  Act  and  organized  Labour’s  exemption  from  antitrust
legislation was a protracted one, and the AFL and AABA lobbied intensively from the
outset to obtain favourable amendments. The result was an ambiguous piece of legislation
and a good illustration of how Congress, faced with a politically sensitive situation, tends
to burden the federal judges with the task of “establishing a clear meaning.” It led some
thinkers (Henry Seager in particular) to deplore the absence of legislation along the lines
of  the  British  Trade  Disputes  Act  (1906).  The  unions  claimed the  Clayton Act  was  a
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“Magna Carta” but the “gold bricks” contained “dynamite,” and the judges established a
“clear meaning” which actually made labour’s position worse by proclaiming the right of
private parties to injunctions. Once again, the AABA’s legal expertise had prevailed over
the  AFL’s  leader’s  relative  amateurism  and,  paradoxically,  Daniel  Davenport’s
organisation had served pluralism well. 
12 In the Woodtrim War, to which the tenth chapter is devoted, Ernst provides an even
clearer  example  of  the  pluralist  tide  turning against  the  proprietary  capitalists.  The
secondary boycott had been curtailed and so, from 1910 to 1917, employers had to face
another form of industrial action, the “materials boycott,” most notably carried out by
the New York City locals of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners against
non-union wood-products. The AABA used this opportunity to drum up more support
from the business community and this time, it was Gordon Merritt who led the fight. The
judges’  decision  hinged  on  a  procedural  question  and  gave  a  rather  disappointing
conclusion to a case (Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal (1917)) where an impressive legal arsenal had
been  used  (sweeping  injunctions,  criminal  prosecutions,  damages  actions,  contempt
applications). 
13 The conclusion—which was favourable to the carpenters in that it established that their
boycott  was compatible  with New York’s  conspiracy legislation—must  be read in the
broader context of the judges’ efforts to determine the limits of group solidarity, and
Ernst uses the “Building Trades Councils” cases to point out the extent to which the scope
for action was broadened between the “Great Upheaval” cases and the First World War.
From  the  neo-classical  reliance  on  (horizontal)  competition  as  a  prerequisite  for
secondary action to the acceptance of the “principle of trade unionism” and what the
author refers to as the judges’ “policy of deference to organizing through the BTCs,” the
general attitude evolved a good deal and the lack of contractual relationship with the
subcontractor ceased to be seen as a problem. A battle was won by the carpenters in Paine
but in that same decision, the Clayton Act was interpreted as submitting the unions to
injunctions by private parties, an interpretation confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1921
(Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921)). Nevertheless, despite this portent, the legal
reformers had achieved much during the Woodtrim War and one of their feats had been
to transform the AABA beyond recognition. 
14 Steered by a new captain who had fully endorsed industrial pluralism and whose views
were now roughly in tune with those of the legal reformers and the corporate liberals,
the AABA became the League for Industrial Rights in 1918 and, leaving behind the genteel
tradition so dear to Daniel Davenport and the new captain’s late father, “set sail for the
uncharted waters  of  the corporatist  political  economy of  interwar America” (Lawyers
against Labor, 213).
15 One could certainly argue that  the ways in which the legal  reformers and corporate
liberals succeeded in influencing the judges and legislators could have been explained in
greater detail, but the demonstration that the ball had been set rolling not after the War
—as some historians  would have it—but  as  early  as  the turn of  the century is  most
convincing. In what is undoubtedly one of the best books devoted to the law and labour
history since E.P. Thomson, it is also shown in a masterly manner that in this “place of
conflict” that is the law, the situation was far from monolithic and that legal practitioners
and theoreticians alike fumbled more or less awkwardly towards a modernisation of the
law of industrial relations, in the context of what, in reference to Robert Wiebe’s famous
book, could be described as “the judge’s search for order.”
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